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The Judicial Assault on the Clean Water Act
By Mark Squillaoe
From at least the time of the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Solid Waste Authority of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,' the federal courts have led
an assault on the Clean Water Act (CWA). The primary
target of their attack has been on the scope of "waters"
encompassed by the law. But recent decisions by the
Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia suggest that the courts may be prepared to
move beyond this jurisdictional question. These judicial
efforts to scale back regulations pertaining to water pollu-
tion are utterly at odds with Congress' plain intent when
it adopted the basic scheme of the CWA in 1972.2 More-
over, the courts' decisions undercut the federal govern-
ment's ability to manage one of our most precious natural
resources effectively and efficiently.
This article seeks to identify how and why the courts
fell off the rails and offers a prescription for getting the
CWA and the courts back on track. The discussion begins
with an examination of the key statutory language and
congressional purposes in adopting the law and is fol-
lowed by a brief review of the hydrologic cycle and its
relevance to the scope of the law. The article then shifts
to a discussion of some major CWA decisions with a par-
ticular focus on recent cases. The article is not intended
as a comprehensive review of either the CWA or litigation
under that law. Rather, it chronicles a pattern of treatment
by the courts that has seriously undermined the clear
intent of Congress in adopting the law. The article con-
cludes with suggestions for restoring the Clean Water Act
to its original purposes.
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Background and History of the Clean Water Act
To understand the courts' current treatment of the CWA,
it is necessary to review the background and history behind
the act. The initial federal foray into the regulation of water
pollution came from the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Appro-
priation Act. Section 13 of this act prohibited, among other
things, the discharge of refuse into navigable waters or their
tributaries without first obtaining a permit from the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.3 This act was followed in 1948 by
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which authorized
the surgeon general of the Public Health Service to work
with state, federal, and local agencies to reduce or eliminate
pollution from "interstate waters and their tributaries."4
The 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act form the core of what is now called the Clean
Water Act. The very first sentence of this legislation describes
the essential purpose of the act as follows: "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters."' Even though the statute does not
define the phrase "the Nation's waters," there seems little
doubt that Congress hoped to protect all of the nation's
waters without regard to questions about federal jurisdic-
tion. The key permitting sections of the CWA, however,
specifically regulate discharges into "navigable waters,"' a
phrase that Congress unhelpfully defined as "waters of the
United States."7 Despite Congress' failure to articulate its
intentions more clearly in the statute itself, the legislative
history leaves little doubt that Congress intended that this
language be construed broadly. The conference report on
the bill that became the law expresses the conferees' inten-
tion "that the term 'navigable waters' be given the broad-
est possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered
by agency determinations which have been made or may
be made for administrative purposes."' Rep. John Dingell
(D-Mich.) explained the conferees' intent as follows:
The conference bill defines the term "navigable
waters" broadly for water quality purposes. It means
all "the waters of the United States" in a geographic
sense. It does not mean "navigable waters" in the
technical sense as we sometimes see in some laws ...
. [Tihis new definition clearly encompasses all water
bodies, including main streams and their tributaries,
for water quality purposes. No longer are the old, nar-
row definitions of navigability, as determined by the
Corps of Engineers, going to govern matters covered
by this bill.'
Plainly, Congress did not intend that the phrase "navi-
gable waters" be given its traditional meaning as articulated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1870 decision in The
Daniel Ball,0 but rather that the phrase should be read
expansively.
This broad construction of the Clean Water Act is also
consistent with common sense and basic scientific prin-
ciples relating to the country's water resources. We all know
that water exists in a hydrologic cycle." As such, all of our
water resources are, at some level, interrelated. Mismanag-
ing some of our water has an impact on the availability
and use of other water. Mismanagement can, for example,
increase the scarcity of potable water supplies, thus driving
up the cost and availability of water, and can cause envi-
ronmental problems, killing fish and other biotic resources.
Given the instrumental role the nation's water resources
play in the public's health and welfare and in the economic
well-being of our society, the U.S. Supreme Court's 1982
decision in Sporbase v. Nebraska,12 declaring water an article
of commerce, seems tinsurprising. But that decision does
reinforce the interrelated nature of our water resources
and the importance of a national and holistic management
program.
The Key Regulatory Requirements of Sections 402 and 404
Two key provisions of the CWA-§ 402 and § 404-are
critical to achieving Congress' goal of restoring and maintain-
ing the integrity of our nation's waters.'3 The U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) administers this program,
although the EPA may approve programs that allow states
to issue § 402 permits;" indeed, most states have received
approval to operate their own programs under 5 402.15 Sec-
tion 404 of the CWA authorizes permits for "the discharge
of dredged or fill materials into the navigable waters at
specified disposal sites" and is administered by the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.'" Like the § 402 program, states
may seek the authority to administer the § 404 program in
their states,' but unlike the case with the 5 402 program,
only two states-Michigan and New Jersey-currently have
such authority. 8
Shortly after the amendments to the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act were enacted in 1972, the Army Corps of
Engineers promulgated rules defining the phrase "navigable
waters of the United States" as "those waters which are
presently or have been in the past, or may be in the future
susceptible for us for purposes of interstate or foreign com-
merce." 9 Two years later, when the Corps adopted rules to
address the § 404 permitting program, the Corps described
its jurisdiction over "waters of the United States" as encom-
passing the full scope of traditional navigable waters. 20 In
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway,21 the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia rejected the Corps'
definition, holding that Congress had "asserted federal juris-
diction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent per-
missible inder the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." 22
More specifically, the court found that the term "navigable
waters" as used in the CWA "is not limited to the traditional
test of navigability."23
In response to the court's decision, in 1975, the Corps
promulgated interim final rules that largely tracked final
rules that were eventually promulgated in 1977. These rules
made clear that "waters of the United States" included "iso-
lated wetlands and lakes, intermittent stream, prairie pot-
holes, and other waters that are not part of tributary system
to interstates waters or to navigable waters of the United
States, the degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate commerce." 24 These rules were further "clarified"
in 1986 to explain that the phrase "waters of the United
States" includes intrastate waters that are (1) used by migra-
tory birds that cross state lines or are protected by migratory
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bird treaties, (2) used as habitat for endangered species,
or (3) used by crops sold in interstate commerce.25 This
clarification of the rules followed, in part, from the Supreme
Court's full-throated support of the Corps' broad interpreta-
tion of jurisdiction under the CWA in the 1985 decision,
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc. 26
Riverside involved a proposal to build a housing project
in southeastern Michigan, about one mile from Lake St.
Clair. The development would have required the filling of
wetlands adjacent to a navigable stream that emptied into
Lake St. Clair. Accordingly, the Army Corps of Engineers
insisted that Riverside first obtain a § 404 permit. Although
Riverside was arguably an easy case, the Court spoke in
broad language, using the test used in deciding Chevron
US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 7 to uphold
the Corps' conclusion that "wetlands adjacent to lakes, rivers,
streams, and other bodies of water may function as integral
parts of the aquatic environment even when the moisture
creating the wetlands does not find its source in the adjacent
bodies of water."28 Pointing to the expertise of the EPA and
the Corps, a unanimous Supreme Court held the following:
"In view of the breadth of the federal regulatory authority
contemplated by the Act itself and the inherent difficulties
of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps'
ecological judgment about the relationship between waters
and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for
a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as
waters under the Act."2 9
At this point, judicial attitudes toward the CWA seemed to
have evolved largely as Congress intended, with the courts
recognizing broad federal authority over water pollution.
Judicial opinions on the CWA track closely with Congress'
stated intentions, and the courts' rulings fit well within our
basic scientific understanding of water resource manage-
ment. In 1998, however, a federal circuit court signaled an
abrupt turn in the judiciary's treatment of the CWA. Three
years later, the Supreme Court dealt its own devastating
blow, and the Clean Water Act has yet to recover.
The Undoing of the Clean Water Act in the Courts
A good starting point for understanding the role of the
courts in undermining the CWA is the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in National
Mining Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.30 That
case involved a challenge to regulations promulgated jointly
by the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers in response
to an earlier lawsuit filed by the National Wildlife Federa-
tion, which charged the Corps with failing to regulate the
draining and clearing of about 700 acres of wetlands in
North Carolina.31 The case was settled when the EPA and
the Corps agreed to propose new rules to address permit-
ting requirements for land clearing and excavation activities.
The key issue in National Mining Association involved an
interpretation of the term "discharge" as used in § 404 of
the CWA, which is defined as "an addition of any pollutant
to any navigable waters from any point source."3 2 The new
rules defined the "discharge of dredged or fill material" to
include "any redeposit of dredged material."33
From an environmental perspective, the definition made
perfect sense. Dredging activities done for the purpose of
draining and channeling water into ditches and canals have
wreaked havoc on our nation's waters throughout its his-
tory. (For a further description of of these adverse impacts
see Mark Squillace, From "Navigable Waters" to "Constitu-
tional Waters": The Future of Federal Wetlands Regulation,
40 Mich. J.L. Reform 799, 809-810 (2007).) But the National
Mining Association claimed that any "incidental fallback"
that might result from dredging activities did not amount
to the "addition of a pollutant," and therefore could not be
regulated under § 404. Although the agencies were care-
ful to limit the rule to redeposits that destroy or degrade
the waters of the United States,34 the court ruled that "the
straightforward statutory term 'addition' cannot reasonably
be said to encompass the situation in which material is
removed from the waters ... and a small portion of it hap-
pens to fall back."35 A fair response is: Why not?-especially
when an agency rule construing ambiguous language is
entitled to considerable deference? 6 Indeed, when Congress
adopted the Clean Water Act in an effort "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation's waters," it surely did not intend that integrity to
be destroyed by unregulated dredging activities just because
the addition involved redepositing materials that had been
dredged. Even the court seemed to acknowledge the
extreme nature of its holding by conceding that "we do not
hold that the Corps may not legally regulate some forms of
redeposit under ... 5 404 ... ."3 But if an "addition" cannot
include incidental fallback, then it is unclear how the Corps
can ever regulate a redeposit. Most incredibly, the court
suggested that, if the agencies made a "reasonable attempt"
to draw a line between activities that could and could not
be regulated, "such a line would merit considerable defer-
ence."3 But the agencies had done that very thing in their
rule and were accorded no deference whatsoever. Despite
repeated efforts, the agencies have had little success fixing
the problems created by the decision in National Mining
Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.39
Even more fundamental to the government's CWA
authority is the scope of the phrase "waters of the United
States." As previously noted, the Court appeared to accept a
broad construction for that phrase in its decision in United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc. But in 2001, in Solid
Waste Authoity of Northem Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, the Supreme Court signaled a sharp retreat
from its holding in Riverside.0 The case of Solid Waste
Authority of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers involved the county's proposal to construct a
landfill that would have resulted in filling some isolated
ponds, which were being used by migratory birds and even
supported the second largest breeding colony of great blue
herons in northeastern Illinois.4" In a 5-4 decision, however,
the Court rejected the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over
these ponds. According to Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
the author of the majority opinion, "ilt was the significant
nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside."
But this was not the basis for the Court's holding in Riv-
erside. On the contrary, the Riverside Court focused on the
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"breadth of the federal regulatory authority contemplated
by the Act, ... the inherent difficulties of defining precise
bounds to regulable waters," and the Corps' ecological
judgment about the relationship between waters and their
adjacent wetlands."42 Indeed, the Court went so far in Riv-
erside as to suggest that it was perfectly appropriate for the
agencies to decide that the law should encompass "some
wetlands that are not significantly intertwined with the
ecosystem of adjacent waterways."" Nonetheless, despite
acknowledging that the legislative history of the statute sup-
ported the "broadest possible constitutional interpretation,"4 1
in its ruling in Solid Waste Authority, the Court suggested
that Congress did not intend to exert anything more than
"its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been
navigable ... or could be reasonably made so.""
Perhaps the most devastating part of the Court's opin-
ion was its conclusion that the Clean Water Act should be
construed narrowly in order to avoid raising a possible con-
stitutional issue.' But a broad interpretation of the phrase
"waters of the United States" does not implicate constitution-
al concerns. The fact that water resources support any num-
ber of commercial activities-from hunting to bird watching
to farming-does not seem in doubt, and the regulation of
these activities is well within Congress' commerce authority
as construed by the Supreme Court.17 If there was any doubt
about the constitutional power to regulate water resources
under the commerce clause, the government's authority to
manage waters used by migratory birds and endangered
species falls well within the government's power under the
treaty.4 8 By erroneously suggesting that a narrow reading of
the law was compelled by the Constitution, the Court effec-
tively reinterpreted the law in a way that Congress never
intended. The Court's ruling also set the stage for a series
of other decisions that have built on this unfortunate trend.
Another distressing thing about the decision in Solid
Waste Authority was its application of the Chevron doctrine
in construing the definition of "navigable waters." As a
result of the Chevron decision courts are required to ask first
whether the statute is clear. If so, the courts must faithfully
apply the statute. But if the law is ambiguous, then the court
must ask whether the agency's interpretation of the statute
was reasonable. Incredibly, the Court found that the defini-
tion of "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States"
was clear. Hedging its bets, however, the Court held that
Chevron did not apply anyway, because the statute sought
to invoke the "outer limits of Congress' power." As already
noted, the regulation of water resources does not come
even close to the limits of congressional power. Thus, Chev-
ron most certainly should have applied to the Solid Waste
Authority case, as the dissent eloquently argued. 9
Solid Waste Authority set the stage for the Court's sub-
sequent decisions in Rapanos v. United Stateso and a com-
panion case, Carabell v. United States." Both cases involved
wetlands adjacent to water bodies that the government
claimed required a permit under 5 404 of the Clean Water
Act. An interesting aspect of the Rapanos and Carabell cases
is that they both involved lands in Michigan, one of two
states with § 404 permitting authority. Rapanos involved
three sites that contained wetlands that were adjacent to
non-navigable tributaries of navigable streams. The facts
in Carabell were interesting, because the site at issue was
within a few miles of the site involved in Riverside and,
like that site only, were about a mile from Lake St. Clair.
Carabell involved a 20-acre site-16 acres of which were
wetlands-that was adjacent to a man-made ditch that
flowed into Lake St. Clair.
Freed from having to consider the limits of constitutional
power by the decision in Solid Waste Authority, the Court
relied on the faulty interpretation of the CWA that it had
adopted in that earlier decision. But a plurality of the Court,
led by Justice Scalia, went even further, announcing that the
word "waters" in the phrase "waters of the United States"
should be given its common dictionary meaning, which he
claimed was "relatively permanent, standing, continuously
flowing bodies of water forming geographic features that
are described in ordinary parlance as streams ... oceans,
rivers [and] lakes."52 Note how far the Court has strayed from
its holding in Riverside and the intent of Congress.
Not only are the Solid Waste Authority and Rapanos deci-
sions unconvincing as a matter of law, they have foisted
upon the government an expensive and entirely unneces-
sary obligation to determine the government's jurisdiction
whenever it attempts to apply the provisions of the Clean
Water Act. In particular, since at least the time of the deci-
sion in Solid Waste Authority, the Army Corps of Engineers
has expended considerable resources employing a formal
"jurisdictional determination" to decide whether the signifi-
cant nexus required by the Supreme Court exists in a par-
ticular case.5 If the Court had accepted the simple argument
that Congress had intended to regulate discharges into all
of our nation's waters, this considerable expenditure of time
and money would become pointless.5
What makes this claim all the more compelling is the
apparent fact that the federal government enjoys over-
whelming support for its position that the CWA should
be read broadly. In Rapanos, 33 states and the District of
Columbia joined an amicus brief supporting the broad con-
struction of the CWA claimed by the United States.55 On its
face, such broad state support for comprehensive federal
control seems somewhat startling. The visceral position of
states is to scrupulously guard their regulatory prerogatives.
In this case, however, the states understood the need to
regulate discharges into all the nation's waters as well as
the impracticality of requiring states to develop separate
state programs to manage those waters that might not be
encompassed by a narrow reading of the law.5
The reaction of the lower courts to Rapanos has not been
terribly surprising even if it has been more troubling. United
States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co.17 involved a spill of 3,000 bar-
rels of oil from a leaky pipeline into an unnamed ephemeral
creek that discharged into Ennis Creek, which flowed into
Rough Creek, before discharging into the Double Moun-
tain Fork of the Brazos River. Only Double Mountain Fork
flowed continuously. The federal government brought an
action against Chevron under the Oil Pollution Act, which
defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States"
just like the CWA does. The evidence suggested that there
was no water flowing in the creek when the spill occurred
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in August 2000 until October 12, 2000, when a rainfall event
occurred. The government produced evidence of extensive
contamination of the soils in the creek after Oct. 12, 2000,
suggesting that some of these contaminated soils would be
washed downstream to navigable waters. Nonetheless, the
federal district court granted Chevron's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the evidence that the oil
would reach jurisdictional waters was speculative. 8
Even assuming that Justice Scalia's opinion in Rapanos
reflects current law, the district court probably got it wrong
in United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co. In his plurality
opinion in Rapanos, Scalia noted that, "from the time of the
CWA's enactment, lower courts have held that the discharge
into intermittent channels of any pollutant that naturally
washes downstream likely violates [the CWA]. as long
as the pollutant ultimately flows into jurisdictional waters.
But skepticism about the scope of the CWA as set forth in
Solid Waste Authority and Rapanos surely provided cover
for the court; and indeed, the government chose not to
appeal the district court's decision.
Even more egregious than Chevron Pipe Line is the
decision handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Robison.6 This case
involved a pipe manufacturer named McWane that had
discharged pollutants into Avondale Creek, which flows
into Village Creek, then Locust Fork, then Bayview Lake,
and finally into the Black Warrior River, which is indisput-
ably a navigable river in Alabama. McWane held a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) for this
discharge for many years, suggesting that McWane believed
it was required to have a permit for its discharges. The gov-
ernment presented uncontested evidence that McWane had
ordered its employees to discharge pollutants in violation of
the permit, and the resulting violations were repeated and
intentional. The government filed criminal charges against
several parties, and a jury convicted three employees on 22
of 25 counts for knowingly violating the Clean Water Act.
All the alleged violations occurred before either the Solid
Waste Authority case or the Rapanos case was decided,
and the indictment and convictions were handed down
well before the Rapanos decision.' Nonetheless, on appeal,
the defendants argued that Rapanos precluded applica-
tion of the CWA to Avondale Creek, and-to the surprise
of many-the court agreed. What makes this decision so
unexpected is that the court acknowledged that jurisdiction
appeared to have been satisfied under either the Scalia plu-
rality opinion in Rapanos, which recognized that pollution
discharges that ultimately flow into navigable waters are
covered by the law, or by the dissenters, who read the CWA
to afford broad jurisdiction. The court nonetheless held
that the controlling opinion in the case was that of Justice
Kennedy, and that the government had failed to establish a
"significant nexus" between Avondale Creek and the Black
Warrior River as Justice Kennedy would apparently have
required. The court reached this conclusion even in the face
of testimony by an EPA expert that there was a continuous
uninterrupted flow between Avondale Creek and the Black
Warrior River. Because the expert failed to opine on the
"significant nexus" between the two bodies of water, the
court found the evidence insufficient to sustain a convic-
tion.62 The Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the case.
Perhaps both Chevron Pipe Line and Robison were
wrongly decided, but the Supreme Court's narrow view of
the Clean Water Act clearly invited these results. What is
perhaps most distressing is the fact that few people really
believe that the federal government lacks the power to
regulate the dumping of oil into an ephemeral creek or the
discharge of pollutants into flowing waters that ultimately
discharge into much larger water bodies. But that now
appears to be the world in which we live.
Although different in kind from these decisions, two
other decisions-one by the Supreme Court and the other
by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia-
rankle as much as these other decisions. In Coeur Alaska
Inc. v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council,3 the Court
addressed the interplay between § 402 and § 404 of the
Clean Water Act.. Coeur Alaska involved a mining company
that proposed to discharge mine tailings and other waste
into the Lower Slate Lake-a 23-acre lake in the Tongass
National Forest of Alaska. The discharges would kill all
the fish and most of its aquatic life in the lake and would
raise the elevation of the lake bed by 50 feet, causing the
lake area to expand from 23 acres to 60 acres. The mining
company obtained a § 404 permit from the Army Corps of
Engineers, but the plaintiff alleged that the company was
required to obtain a § 402 permit, because the Clean Water
Act classifies the discharged material as a pollutant."6
In denying the plaintiffs request for relief, the Court
noted that, under § 402, the Environmental Protection
Agency may issue permits "[e]xcept as provided in ...
[§ 4041." Thus, if the mining company were eligible for a
§ 404 permit, it could arguably avoid the need for a § 402
permit. According to the Court, the company's eligibil-
ity for a permit depended on whether the mine tailings
could be classified as "fill materials" within the meaning of
§ 404. Here the Court relied on the EPA rules that define
"fill material" as any "material ... [that] has the effect of ...
[c]hanging the bottom elevation of any portion of a water
of the United States."65 It should be noted that these rules
excluded trash or garbage, and one could easily argue that
using a natural lake to dispose of mine tailings was essen-
tially using it for garbage. But the more important point,
which Justice Ginsburg made so eloquently in her dissent,
is that 5 306(e) of the Clean Water Act states unequivocally
that "it shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any
new source to operate such a source in any standard of
performance applicable to such source."' And the EPA had
adopted specific new source performance standards for the
froth flotation process that was proposed for use by Coeur
Alaska in this case.67 As the dissent noted, the act could eas-
ily be read to support both the § 404 permit and EPA's stan-
dards of performance in a manner that would undermine
the essence of the CWA. Moreover, the majority effectively
exalted the EPA's regulation that defined fill material over
the standard of performance requirement contained in the
statute.
Any doubt about the proper resolution of the Coeur
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Alaska case should surely have been resolved in a manner
consistent with the basic purposes of the statute. But here
the Court adopted a construction that intentionally autho-
rized the biological destruction of a freshwater lake. How
this result can possibly be understood as one that would
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the waters of the United States" is not clear.
One final case is Mingo Logan Coal Company Inc. v. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, which involved a § 404
permit that was issued by the Army Corps of Engineers
for the Spruce No.1 coal mine in West Virginia but was
subsequently "vetoed" by the EPA. The Mingo Logan Coal
Company, a subsidiary of Arch Coal Company, challenged
the EPA's authority to overturn the permit. A careful read-
ing of § 404 of the statute is necessary to understand the
issue before the court in this case. First, § 404(a) authorizes
the secretary of the army to "issue permits ... for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters
at specified disposal sites"; 5 404(b) then provides that "such
disposal site shall be specified for each such permit by the
Secretary"; finally, § 404(c) authorizes the administrator of
the "to prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal
of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site, and
... to deny or restrict the use of any defined area for speci-
fication ... whenever he determines ... that the discharge
of such materials into such area will have an unacceptable
adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds
and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas),
wildlife, or recreational areas." Thus, the essence of a
5 404 permit is the specification of a disposal site, and if the
EPA prohibits the specification of a particular disposal site,
any permit issued for that disposal site would appear to be
invalid. Therefore, even though § 404(c) of the CWA does
not actually use the term "veto," the effect of an EPA deci-
sion to prohibit or withdraw a specification of a disposal site
is to veto the permit.
The Spruce No. 1 coal mine in West Virginia, which was
the subject of the 5 404 permit in the Mingo Logan case, is
one of the largest mountain removal mines ever proposed
for Appalachia. The mine is designed in a way that would
disturb approximately 3.5 square miles of land and bury
approximately 7.48 miles of mountain streams.9 The Corps
issued a § 404 permit to Mingo Logan in 2007, but when
the EPA identified "significant new scientific information
confirming and strengthening EPA's concerns regarding the
environmental effects of mountaintop mining operations,
and in particular those operations on the scope and scale of
the Spruce No. 1 Mine," the EPA initiated a proceeding to
consider withdrawing the specification set out in the pennit.
The EPA received more than 50,000 comments and made
detailed findings about the specific adverse impacts on fish
and wildlife resources that would result from the operation
of the mine.70 Even though the EPA's conclusion was fully
supported by the U.S Fish and Wildlife Service, in a decision
that shocked many familiar with the basic structure and his-
tory of the CWA, the court held that the EPA did not have
the authority to overturn the decision made by the Anny
Corps of Engineers.
The decision handed down by Judge Amy Berman Jack-
son, a recent Obama appointee to the district court, found
that "whatever section 404(c) means, it only talks about
prohibiting, restricting, or withdrawing a specification, and
it does not give EPA any role in connection with permits."''
It is entirely unclear how the court reached this conclusion.
If the EPA prohibits or withdraws the specification of a
disposal site, then a permit that specifies that site is ren-
dered meaningless. Thus, it is not surprising that courts and
commentators have routinely described § 404(c) as giving
the EPA veto power over dredge and fill permits.72 Indeed,
despite the court's suggestion that the EPA plays no role in
the 5 404 permitting process, the court concedes that the
EPA can "veto the use of certain disposal sites at the start,
thereby blocking the issuance of permits for those sites."7 3
What appeared to trouble the court, however, was the
fact that the Environmental Protection Agency vetoed the
permit nearly two years after it had been approved. As
the court recognized, two words in § 404 of the CWA-
"withdrawal" and "whenever"-are critical to construing the
scope of the EPA's power under § 404(c). One would have
to concede that the use of the parenthetical phrase in the
phrase "prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal
of specification) of any defined area as a disposal site ... " is
awkward at best. But the only logical reading of this phrase
is that Congress intended to allow the EPA to withdraw a
specification after it was approved by the Corps. But the
court somehow concluded that, no matter what authority
the EPA may have to withdraw a specification, that does
not necessarily mean that the agency had the authority to
withdraw the specification "after a permit has already been
issued."74 But what else could it mean? There could be no
need to withdraw a specification if that specification were
not already made in a permit decision. The court found that
the question ultimately turned on the meaning of the word
"whenever" in the phrase "whenever he determines ... that
the discharge of such materials ... will have an unaccept-
able adverse effect." Even though the word "whenever"
appears to suggest that the EPA can make this finding "at
any time," the court determined that the word merely sig-
naled a predicate to the finding of adverse environmental
effects. The court attempted to reinforce this conclusion by
pointing to what it described as the "exclusive permitting
authority accorded the Corps in section 404(a)."5
What is perhaps most troubling about this decision is
the dismissive way that the judge treated the Environmental
Protection Agency and its role under the Clean Water Act.
Although the court suggested that the Chevron doctrine
applied to the case and that the language of the statute was
unclear, there is no deference to the EPA or even respect
for its role in the process.7
For those who have been dealing with the environmen-
tal consequences of mountaintop removal mining, and the
long-standing failure of the federal government to enforce
the requirements of the CWA in approving permits for
mountaintop mines, the EPA's decision on the Spruce No.
1 coal mine to at long last tackle this problem undoubtedly
came as a welcome surprise. The court's subsequent use of
an entirely unconvincing reading of the statute to declare
that the EPA lacks the power to protect the ecological integ-
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rity of the nation's water resources represents yet another
example of the recent pattern of judicial hostility toward the
Clean Water Act.7
Solving the Problem
What is perhaps most troubling about this story is how
removed the courts have allowed themselves to become
from the overarching purposes of the law. When Congress
declared that it was enacting the Clean Water Act in order
to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
logical integrity of the Nation's waters,"7 it surely had little
expectation that the courts would ignore these purposes
and use ambiguous language to indirectly advance activi-
ties that have exactly the opposite effect. Something needs
to change if we expect to recapture the original mission of
the CWA.
The best and most practical solution is through legisla-
tion. Until the 2010 election made CWA reform legislation
unlikely, Congress had considered various versions of the
Clean Water Restoration Act79 over several years that would,
in essence, redefine "waters of the United States" to mean
"all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, the ter-
ritorial seas, and all interstate and intrastate waters and
their tributaries, including lakes, rivers, streams (including
intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,
prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, natural ponds,
and all impoundments of the foregoing, to the fullest extent
that these waters, or activities affecting these waters, are
subject to the legislative power of Congress under the
Constitution." Few doubt that such legislation would pass
constitutional muster, thus giving the lie to the majority's
finding in Solid Waste Authority of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that the Clean Water Act had
to be read narrowly in order "to avoid the significant consti-
tutional ... questions" raised in that case."0 Even accepting
the Supreme Court's recent decisions that limit the govern-
ment's power under the Commerce Clause to activities that
have a significant economic impact on the public,81 the pro-
posed language seems likely to satisfy that test quite easily.
Moreover, by not limiting itself to the Commerce Clause, the
proposed legislation would allow the government to use its
treaty powere and perhaps other authorities delineated in
the Constitution.
But a simpler solution could result with a one-vote shift
on the Supreme Court. Predicting vacancies, ideological
preferences, and voting on the Supreme Court may be
a risky business, but it seems fairly safe to assume that
replacing one of the conservative judges on the Court with
a liberal appointee could very well lead the Court to revive
its broad reading of the Clean Water Act, as it did in River-
side. This development might require the Court to overturn
its decision in Solid Waste Authority or Rapanos, or both.
Given that both these cases were decided on the slimmest
of margins, such a change is not inconceivable.
Conclusion
For reasons that are somewhat hard to understand, the
federal courts have shown a surprising hostility to the Clean
Water Act." Beyond simply tying the hands of the federal
government in its effort to implement key aspects of this
law, the courts' recent rulings have created an inefficient
and far less effective program for protecting and preserving
our water resources for present and future generations. This
does not seem like an outcome that anyone really wants,
but it is an outcome that seems all too inevitable under cur-
rent law. TFL
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